## AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION

OF

ORAL ARGUMENT

KENNEY VS. AMERICAN BOARD OF INTERNAL MEDICINE
NO. 20-1007

Transcribed by: Joanne M. Gagliardi, CSR, RPR

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JUDGE CHAGARES: Thank you. The first case this morning will be No. 20-1007, Kenney vs. American Board of Internal Medicine. We welcome counsel. Although we wish we could see you live, we're happy to be doing this via Zoom. And with that said, Counsel, would you like to reserve some time for rebuttal?

MR. CURLEY: Yes, your Honor, I'd like to reserve two minutes of my time for rebuttal. JUDGE CHAGARES: Okay. That's granted. I will keep track of time, and I suggest that you do so too so you don't get thrown off when we call it, okay?

So you have a total of 15 minutes, and your opening argument will be 13, okay?

MR. CURLEY: Thank you.
JUDGE CHAGARES: All right. You can proceed when you're ready.

MR. CURLEY: May it please the Court.
Good morning. My name is Philip Curley. I represent the plaintiff-appellants.

Your Honor, as the district court went well beyond its purview when it dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs' tying claims, there

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1 are five reasons that ruling should be reversed.
2 First, the Court took it upon itself to restate
3 the tying claims entirely. Plaintiffs allege
4 that having first purchased certifications, they
5 are forced later by ABIM to buy its Maintenance
6 of Certification product, referred to by its
7 acronym MOC and pronounced "mock;" and that if
8 they do not later buy MOC, their certifications
9 are revoked.
The district court wrongly redefined the
11 essence that put it -- as the Court put it, as
12 something plaintiffs never alleged; that in
13 order to purchase certifications, quote,
14 internists are forced to purchase MOC products

1 certified, depending on where the internist is
2 in his or her career, right: Initial
3 certification and then the MOC which keeps them, 4 quote unquote, certified or deemed certified as 5 opposed to not certified.

Now, the district court said that there's

MR. CURLEY: Well, the flaw in that approach, your Honor, $I$ think is that the test for separate products, of course, is whether there is separate demand; and ABIM sells two different products. Certification has always been a one-time snapshot assessment of postgraduate medical education and residency training. That's what it's been for the 90 years that it's been around.

The MOC product, on the other hand --
JUDGE GREENWAY: (Inaudible) disagreement about that, but go ahead.

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MR. CURLEY: The MOC product, on the other hand, is different. According to ABIM's own form 990 filed with the IRS, MOC, quote, means something different, end quote, from certifications, and MOC is designed to help keep internists current. So that's the difference between the two products.

And the history of the two products supports separate demand. MOC is a continuing professional development product that has been sold separately from certifications, not only by hundreds of other vendors over the decades, but also by ABIM itself.

JUDGE GREENWAY: But here's what I don't understand, Counsel: The complaint of the plaintiffs is we're not certified. If each of the plaintiffs that are named ended up being certified, there would be no issue here. So it seems to me that the certification is what's key. Tell me why that's wrong? Am I just thinking about this wrong?

MR. CURLEY: Well, each of the plaintiffs, in fact, your Honor, are certified. They each purchased certifications; and then when they did

1 not buy the MOC product, those certifications
2 were revoked and that's the tie. ABIM forces

JUDGE CHAGARES: Hold on, Counsel, before you go on, you say -- I mean are the internists really forced to buy this?

MR. CURLEY: Well, they are forced to buy it, your Honor, by ABIM's policy revoking their certifications if they do not, and that's forcing because certifications are an economic necessity. They will lose their hospital admitting privileges, insurance coverage, malpractice coverage, so certifications in MOC are an economic necessity. And we pleaded that specifically and addressed that specifically in


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| 1 | it is a pure product; and those types of |
| 2 | features that you mentioned, courses, |
| 3 | evaluations, lectures, all of those are provided |
| 4 | by other vendors. They're provided by |
| 5 | continuing medical education vendors, or CME. |
| 6 | They are provided by clinics, and Mayo Clinic |
| 7 | has their own series of courses that it offers |
| 8 | to help keep internists current. Hospitals, |
| 9 | especially major urban hospitals, have their own |
| 10 | continuing professional development courses. |
| 11 | So those features that you mentioned are |
| 12 | not unique to ABIM's CPD product. They're not |
| 13 | unique to MOC; and, in fact, those features have |
| 14 | been satisfied and those needs have been |
| 15 | satisfied by other vendors for decades without |
| 16 | those other vendors selling certification. |
| 17 | I think it's important to note here that |
| 18 | ABIM sold three other MOC-type products in the |
| 19 | '70s and '80s, sand-blown products; and they |
| 20 | were not mandatory, they were voluntary. So |
| 21 | that tells us a couple of things. First of all, |
| 22 | that ABIM itself has a history of selling those |
| 23 | two products separately; and, secondly, it tells |
| 24 | us that the only reason that MOC is successful |

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1 is because ABIM has now made it mandatory. If
2 you do not buy MOC, then you lose your
3 certification.
4 JUDGE CHAGARES: Can I just ask you a 5 related question? Do we have to ignore ABIM's 6 argument that allowing internists forego MOC 7 that's a defense that ABIM certainly is free to

1 raise, your Honor, and I'm sure that it is, but 2 it's not a defense that can be given conclusive 3 effect at this early stage in the proceedings.

9

JUDGE GREENWAY: Judge Chagares, I wanted to move to RICO, if that's okay.

JUDGE CHAGARES: Sure.
JUDGE GREENWAY: Counsel, now on RICO, let's assume for the moment that point (inaudible) bring the RICO claim, right? When I look at paragraph 135 of the Amended Complaint, after providing a list of the seven statements that you allege beneath that, the same or similar statements of fact and others to the same effect have been made by ABIM and its agents repeatedly over the years in addition to appearing on the website.

Now, obviously that speaks to the fraud part of your claim, and $I$ want to talk about 9B's requirement of fraud with particularity. How is that statement in 135 not the antithesis of the particularity requirement of $9 B$ requiring that fraud be pled with particularity date, time and place?

MR. CURLEY: Well, I think, first of all,

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1 in the paragraph preceding that there is a 2 specific reference to -- if I recall correctly, 3 to a statement made by the then-president of 4 ABIM a date and source and location; but I think 5 that the website --

6 JUDGE GREENWAY: There's no specific date
7 in paragraph 134. It says the summer of '99,
8 which speaks to the lack of date, time and
9 place, so ...

11 to the publication in which that statement was
12 published. So I think it satisfies 9B, and I
13 think the allegation with respect to the website
14 do as well. Those are continuing statements
15 that have been out in the public since it was
16 posted on the website and there today. So
17 there's no mystery to ABIM what we are claiming
18 the fraudulent misrepresentations are or when
19 they were made and where.
plaintiffs read or heard these statements? Where do you allege that the plaintiffs'

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1 employers read or heard these statements?

MR. CURLEY: We do allege that, your
Honor. I don't have the specific paragraphs at my fingertips, but we do allege that the third party's hospitals and insurance companies heard those and believe those misrepresentations and as a result were convinced to require internists to buy the MOC product.

JUDGE GREENWAY: So your -- it's your position that you've pled sufficiently and with sufficient particularity date, time and place?

MR. CURLEY: Yes, your Honor. We believe we satisfied rule 9B, and of course that wasn't the basis of the decision below, although you're certainly free to raise the question now.

I see that $I$ only have one minute left. I'm happy to answer more questions if you'd like to, but $I$ would like to save that for rebuttal, if $I$ could.

JUDGE CHAGARES: Well, I actually have another one. Judge Greenway, are you done with that line of questioning?

JUDGE GREENWAY: I am. After you, sir, I'd like to ask a question on monopolization,

1 but I'm happy to wait. No worries.
2 JUDGE CHAGARES: I was just going to just
3 jump back to and we'll -- no problem. Another
4 question of tying. You know, there are cases 5 cited on franchises and all, but does the fact 6 that ABIM is a professional organization matter 7 here analytically?

MR. CURLEY: I don't think it does. There certainly is no exemption in the Sherman Act. for professional organizations or associations, and I think the important point here is that ABIM is the uncontested monopoly supplier certification, so it has -- it doesn't have just market power, it has monopoly power and that's what gives it the ability to force enter and it's to buy MOC.

So, no, your Honor, I don't think that -that professional organizations -- even assuming ABIM is one, $I$ think it's more of a trade association and pursues its own interests and not the interests of the internist community or patients; but even assuming it were, I don't think that can set off (inaudible). JUDGE CHAGARES: Judge Greenway, go ahead.

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JUDGE GREENWAY: Oh, thanks so much.
I just wanted to pick up on something Judge Chagares asked you and your comment. If the MOCs are not the equivalent of the NBPAS's MOC product and the CME's, is there even an effect on the market?

MR. CURLEY: Well, I think there is, your Honor. The effect is on the market for consent for continuing professional development products. All of those products, the MOC product, the NBPAS product and the CME products, those are all intended to help keep internists current; and different vendors approach that in different ways, but that's the goal of all of them. So that is the market, and I think it does --

JUDGE GREENWAY: So --
MR. CURLEY: I'm sorry?
JUDGE GREENWAY: So all three of them in your view are vying for internists in the same market?

MR. CURLEY: Absolutely, your Honor. They're all vying for the internists' dollar to buy these products to help them keep current.

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JUDGE GREENWAY: I had one last question on monopolization, if that's okay?

JUDGE CHAGARES: Sure.
JUDGE GREENWAY: Thanks. So just to focus on monopolization for a second, the district court assumed in its opinion that the market for the monopolization claim was the same market that the plaintiffs had alleged with the tying claim, so essentially that they're separate markets. Do you have any quarrel with that analysis?

MR. CURLEY: I don't, your Honor. As we allege, the mark that it's the subject of our claim, our section 2 claim, is the MOC -- is the MOC market. Now, the interesting thing say anything about the MOC market, $\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{C}$ market, is that it's a captive market; and although it is a CPD product, continuing professional development product, as a result of ABIM's tying and monopolization, it has created a captive market for that particular product, giving consumers, here the internists, no choice but to buy the MOC product.

JUDGE GREENWAY: Well, how are the markets

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1 different? I -- is the market for the purpose
2 of the monopolization claim different than the 3 market for the purpose of the tying claim?

4 MR. CURLEY: No, your Honor. The tied
5 product is MOC for the tying claim, and the
6 market that is the subject of the section 2
7 claim is also the MOC market.
JUDGE GREENWAY: Thank you.
JUDGE CHAGARES: I just had another question and maybe you can enlighten us on this. It seems that the district court and the parties have really spent a lot of time on the per se analysis. What about the rule of reason analysis? Is there any reason to resort to that?

MR. CURLEY: I don't think so, your Honor, although it did plead an alternative rule of reason account, but here and the Supreme Court in the third circuit precedent $I$ think is pretty clear when the seller of the tying product has monopoly power, the anti-competitive effect, the injury is presumed, which makes it susceptible to a per se pie.

We did complete an alternative rule of

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| 1 | reason and we believe we've repled antitrust |
| 2 | injury without having to presume it, but the |
| 3 | monopoly that ABIM has is so strong that we |
| 4 | believe per se treatment is appropriate. |
| 5 | JUDGE CHAGARES: Thank you. |
| 6 | Judge Greenway, anything more? |
| 7 | JUDGE GREENWAY: Many more things, but no. |
| 8 | JUDGE CHAGARES: Okay. |
| 9 | Judge Nygaard, do you have anything to |
| 10 | ask? |
| 11 | JUDGE NYGAARD: No, Judge Chagares. Both |
| 12 | you and Judge Greenway have asked all the |
| 13 | questions I had. |
| 14 | JUDGE CHAGARES: Thank you. All right, |
| 15 | Counsel, thank you. |
| 16 | We'll turn to appellee's counsel. |
| 17 | MS. JOHN: Good morning, and thank you, |
| 18 | your Honor. Leslie John on behalf of the |
| 19 | appellee, American Board of Internal Medicine. |
| 20 | May it please the Court. This case is |
| 21 | about the right of the American Board of |
| 22 | Internal Medicine to set its own standards for |
| 23 | what it means when it says a physician is ABA -- |
| 24 | ABIM or Board certified. 30 years ago in 1990, |
| 847 | 51.3460 Precise Kruse Reporting 312.345.1500 |

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1 ABIM decided that it would require physicians to
2 demonstrate that they were remaining current in their knowledge in the medicine in order to maintain their Board certifications.

Now, appellees claim -- appellants claim that they're entitled to lifetime certification because they would rather not take the periodic examinations; but that is not the product that they bought. This is one of a handful of cases. This case, the Lazarou case and the Siva cases against certification organizations, and three different courts have all looked at these allegations and each one has reached the same conclusion; that they simply don't amount to an antitrust claim, whether it be tying or monopolization or unjust enrichment, and they certainly don't amount to a RICO violation; and this is the only case in which that particular fraud claim has been asserted.

Now, the parties agree on two key points. Appellants agree with ABIM that ABIM should not be prevented from determining its own standards. And the appellants also agree ABIM should not be required to accept any other continuous

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1 professional development or CPD product as a 2 substitute for its certification or MOC. And 3 those areas of agreement can be found in the 4 appellants' opening brief at pages 10, 21 and 560 .

9 here that they no longer be required to have to
10 participate in MOC to maintain their
11 certifications. They ask that ABIM not revoke
12 the certifications; but, in fact, they could
13 only get that relief if ABIM were forced to accept their standards or another organization's standards in lieu of its own.

But fundamentally that's not the product they bought and the only product $A B I M$ has offered which is Board certification and Board certification that offered a limited time certification, which by its terms would expire unless the diplomate were to continue to take and pass periodic examinations to demonstrate his or her knowledge in the field.

JUDGE GREENWAY: Counsel, when you --

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JUDGE CHAGARES: Can I ask you a question?
I asked your adversary as well. Does the fact that ABIM is a professional organization or something like that matter analytically?

MS. JOHN: It does matter analytically because I do believe the rule of reason would govern the analysis here. And so the rule of reason would require as per se that there be two separate products that they're not beforcing [sic], so in that respect the test for tying is the same whether it's per se or rule of reason.

But what the rule of reason does is it also adds in another requirement, and that requirement is that, in fact, you show an effect on competition in the tied product market; and the effect on competition in the tied product market here, the tied product market is MOC, or Maintenance of Certification.

Now, in his argument appellant -appellants' counsel confuses it because he says the tied product market is continuous professional development, but it's not. If you look at the allegations in the Amended Complaint, it's MOC. Continuous professional

1 development is something that could be
2 different, so, for instance, taking continuing
3 medical education, and, in fact, ABIM accepts 4 continuing medical education from any number of 5 providers. That allegation can be found in the 6 Amended Complaint.

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12
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So here if it's rule of reason, you have to show an effect in the tied market, which is MOC, not CPD, and that's something, quite frankly, the allegations in the Amended Complaint don't do. And I would just direct your attention to the cases of this court in the Massachusetts School of Law at Andover vs. ABA, U.S. vs. Brown University. Those cases quite clearly establish that rule of reason applies when considering rules adopted by professional societies. And the court went on to say, and this is in the Massachusetts School of Andover case, even when the behavior resembles conduct usually subject to a per se approach. So I do think it's rule of reason, as your Honor has asked.

JUDGE CHAGARES: One other point. You had said there are two things you agree on. In

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1 appellants' brief, page 17 and note 7 they say
2 ABIM doesn't contest, for purposes of the motion
3 to dismiss, that it possesses monopoly power
4 over -- in the certifications. Is that true?
5 MS. JOHN: Well, it's not a grounds that
6 we -- we don't concede that ground, but we don't
7 raise that on our motion to dismiss. We raised
8 a separate product in the forcing issues, as
9 well as the rule of reason issue on the motion
10 to dismiss. We haven't raised that as a
11 separate argument, but we don't concede it.
JUDGE CHAGARES: Judge Greenway, I'm
13 sorry.
JUDGE GREENWAY: No, no, please, let's just --

JUDGE CHAGARES: No, I thought I -- go ahead.

JUDGE GREENWAY: Yeah, let's just talk about rule of -- not rule of reason -- RICO for a moment. Okay. So I asked your adversary about pleading forward with particularity pursuant to 9B, and I said just put aside standing for a moment. I know that the principal basis for the district court's

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1 decision with standing, but my inquiry is: Even
2 if you get past standing, is there fraud pled
3 with particularity?

Your adversary referred to paragraphs 133 -- 134 and 135 and I think there are a few paragraphs after that that essentially lay out the fraud. Can you speak to the point of particularity, please.

MS. JOHN: Yes. So I would submit respectfully that fraud is not pled here with particularity, so looking -- let's look at those particular paragraphs of the Complaint. Paragraph 134 of the Amended Complaint talks about a 1999 newsletter. So we're supposed to believe that somehow every hospital payor, employer, or other health care entity read a newsletter in 1999 when there are no allegations about who this newsletter was sent to, how it was disseminated and who considered it.

And then you turn to paragraph 135, which is the ABIM website which contains statements such as MOC makes a difference, and there are no allegations to follow that up that may get plausible that, again, every single hospital,

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1 employer, health care provider or other entity 2 in the health care industry somehow looks at, 3 considers, let alone relies upon statements that 4 are on ABIM's website.

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There are conclusory statements that somehow there is a campaign of misrepresentations but none of the kinds of factual averments to support that are found in the Amended Complaint. We don't know how it is ABIM, if at all it does, communicates with this vast chain. And, in fact, the plaintiffs in their reply brief -- the appellants in their reply brief make it clear that hospitals are not a monolithic entity; that there are, you know, thousands of hospitals around the United States each making its own decision on whether it is going to look to Board certification or not look to board certification so that this -- we have no details about how, in fact, this massive fraud is supposedly perpetrated. And I think it's most telling when it comes to the facts surrounding each of the four specific appellants in this case who claim that a hospital may have made a decision about their admitting privileges

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1 and yet there are none of the details about what
2 that hospital considered, what process that
3 hospital followed. We don't know anything that
4 would allow us to conclude, in fact, that any of
5 these entities were aware of any of these
6 statements on a website much less relied upon
7 them when making any decisions.
8 JUDGE GREENWAY: Let me just jump to
9 monopolization for a moment, two questions on
10 that. If we happen to disagree with the
11 district court's focus on MOC and initial
12 certification as one product, if we disagree
13 with that, does that mean we have to reverse on
14 the monopolization claim?
MS. JOHN: No, I don't think so, your Honor, because for the monopolization claim there has to be anti-competitive conduct at its core, and there must be an abuse of monopoly power. And so, for instance, let's look at the forcing issue. Here the appellants of course claim that they were forced to purchase MOC, but, in fact, all of these appellants could purchase and take the initial certification exam without ever later purchasing Maintenance of

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Certification; and, in fact, one of the appellants, Doctor Manalo, did exactly that. In fact, he has never taken a MOC exam. He's never paid any MOC fees. So there's simply no forcing here.

And on top of that if you'll look at the case law in cases involving professional certification, the courts have, in fact, recognized that certifying organizations that give, like ABIM does, a seal of approval but don't do anything to constrain others to follow it, such as in this case hospitals or employers, does not violate the antitrust laws. And so fundamentally their monopolization is contingent on this concept of an abuse of monopoly power, and there is no such abuse of monopoly power. JUDGE GREENWAY: What is the --

MS. JOHN: Excuse me.
JUDGE GREENWAY: I'm sorry.
MS. JOHN: Oh, okay. Sorry. It also is contingent, of course, on a finding of monopoly power in a relevant market, and here the relevant market that's alleged for purposes of this particular count is MOC. It's not

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1 continuous professional development, and it's 2 not certification.

If you look at the Amended Complaint, it's Maintenance of Certification, and so there really is no adequate relevant market alleged, which of course is a grounds for affirming the dismissal grounds that the third circuit has held in cases like Queen City. You know, this court can and should, you know, affirm dismissals for failure to plead relevant markets.

JUDGE CHAGARES: Could I just ask a follow-up there about forcing? How do we conclude that internists aren't forced to buy MOC at this stage in the litigation in light of the allegations that internists can't successfully practice without certification; and isn't the feasibility of practicing without certification ultimately a question of fact?

MS. JOHN: I think you can first look to the facts in this case. So, for instance, Doctor Manalo who never -- who did purchase initial certification and never purchased Maintenance of Certification, I think that

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1 certainly shows that his purchase of initial
2 certification was not contingent on the later
3 purchase of Maintenance of Certification. So I
4 think that is one way you can look at it.
I think you can also look at it in the way
6 that the second circuit indicated in the
7 Smugglers Notch Homeowners case, which is a case
8 where -- which looked at when you're entering
9 into the transaction and you know that, in fact,
10 you're going to be required -- there are certain
11 components, parts of that entire transaction,
12 and you know that up front and you voluntarily,
13 nonetheless, enter into that contract, that
14 there is no forcing and --
JUDGE CHAGARES: But, Counsel, what I'm talking about is it may not be so voluntary. If they want to make a living, are they forced to buy your product? You seem to say no, they're not forced to, but is that essentially an issue of fact that's more appropriate for summary judgment?

MS. JOHN: I would suggest not because I think when courts look to forcing, they look at what is the situation at the time of the initial

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1 purchase, and at the time of the initial
2 purchase here ABIM had a program for
3 certification; and aspects of that program were
4 initially passing your initial Board
5 certification exam, and then that that
6 certification would expire after a set period of
7 time, ten years, without -- unless that
8 diplomate passed subsequent examinations.

9 obligation as part of the certification program that they would have to demonstrate, in fact, that they possess the requisite knowledge to hold themselves out and say, yes, I am ABIM or Board certified. So there is no forcing because there is the knowledge up front at the time of purchase of what certification entails, and that was the periodic demonstration of knowledge.

JUDGE CHAGARES: But I suppose that the most basic form of your argument is they don't have to go through ABIM to practice?

MS. JOHN: Yes, your Honor. So, for instance, if you look at the Amended Complaint, the Amended Complaint is quite clear that Board

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1 certification is not required to practice
2 medicine in the United States. That is simply a
3 function of state boards of medicine that
4 license doctors. You only need a license in
5 your state to practice medicine. Board
6 certification is not required.
Board certification is more like the stamp
8 of approval that you can hold yourself out to
9 have special qualifications. Some -- some
10 patients and employers look to that; others do
11 not, but it is not a requirement to practice
12 medicine in any state in the United States,
13 which is a fact that is pled in the Amended
14 Complaint.
JUDGE CHAGARES: Well, but I mean this does go to your market power. I mean, yeah, it's true you don't need the ABIM certification, but is it really feasible not to have it in reality? And I think that the allegations, don't they say you -- a lot of places won't let you practice. Your malpractice rates are going to go higher. Reimbursement is going to be an issue. So is it really feasible to practice without certification, and is that something

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1 that should be a subject of discovery as opposed 2 to, you know, at this juncture with a motion to 3 dismiss to resolve?

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MS. JOHN: Well, many -- I would submit many internists do, in fact, practice medicine without a certification; and there are many things that might affect how much you're paid, what your admitting privileges are, things like where you attended medical school and many other factors. But it really comes back to, you know, what is at issue in this case and whether, in fact, there is a tying claim and whether or not there is one product or two products.

And that really goes back to the Supreme Court test in Jefferson Parish about the character of demand and whether there is demand for the tied product in absence of the tying product. And here the appellants want to hold themselves out as being Board certified. There is no separate demand for the tied product in absence of the tying product, and that's something that $I$ think is -- is something that, you know, the court in Jefferson Parish makes clear.

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Justice O'Connor when she expands on the words in that says that for products to be treated as distinct, the tied product must at a minimum be one that consumers might wish to purchase separately without also purchasing the tying product. And here there simply are no allegations of fact sufficient to move this case along to make a plausible case that there are, in fact, two products here because there is no consumers. There are no allegations showing there is demand to purchase the tied product without also purchasing the tying product.

JUDGE CHAGARES: All right. Thank you, Counsel.

Judge Greenway, do you have anything more?
JUDGE GREENWAY: No, thank you, sir.
JUDGE CHAGARES: And, Judge Nygaard, do you have anything more?

JUDGE NYGAARD: No, thank you. I have no questions.

JUDGE CHAGARES: Okay. Thank you.
All right. Thank you, Counsel.
And we'll hear the rebuttal now.
I'm sorry. We can't hear you.

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JUDGE GREENWAY: You're on mute. Mute.
JUDGE CHAGARES: We can't hear you.
MR. CURLEY: Yes. I was --
MR. GREENWAY: Now we can.
MR. CURLEY: I didn't have my clicker set there. Sorry. I apologize.

I think the questions your Honors asked and the answers that were given in almost every case underscored the questions of fact that exist in this case. The Viameia -- the Viamedia case, a recent case from the seventh circuit that came down after the decision below found that both separate products and forcing are -present complex issues of fact that were not susceptible for resolution on summary judgment much less in a motion to dismiss.

So another fact question that arose from your inquiry was professional society. Is ABIM even a professional society? We don't believe it is, but in any event, there certainly is nothing in the Complaint that speaks to that. That's another example of an affirmative defense that $A B I M$ is trying to raise, standards, professional society, internists aren't keeping

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1 up, all sorts of things that can only be
2 resolved after discovery.

JUDGE CHAGARES: Can I go back one second?
Is it your fundamental point that the
determination of separate products, single product, is a question of fact?

MR. CURLEY: Well, yes, it is, your Honor. It depends on separate demand, and we certainly alleged numerous facts that support separate demand. ABIM is claiming that there's not separate demand outside of the allegations of the Complaint, they haven't answered yet or filed any affirmative defenses; but, yes, separate products is a fact question I believe, as is forcing.

And that's what the district court did here that was incorrect; it concluded that as a matter of law, there could only be one product, and it shouldn't have arrived at that or any other conclusion in our judgment.

It arrogated to itself a determination of the ultimate fact issue which is out of the separate products. It was indifferent to our allegations. It improperly weighed evidence.

1 It explicitly made findings. It used those
2 words, and had accepted ABIM's affirmative
3 defenses that are outside of the Complaint. All
4 those are in violation of the proper standards
5 in ruling on a $12(\mathrm{~b})(6)$ motion to dismiss. And
6 we respectfully point out to the Court that this
7 is not a motion where only conclusory
8 recitations of law are pleaded or claims rote
9 elements are simply recited. This is a highly
10 detailed and factual Complaint, and we are
11 entitled to discovery and the right to prove our
12 claim. So we respectfully ask that the district
13 court be reversed.
JUDGE CHAGARES: Thank you, Counsel.
We thank both counsel for their excellent
briefs and argument today. Oh, I'm -- Judge Nygaard, did you have anything you wanted to add?

JUDGE NYGAARD: I have nothing. Thank you. Thank you, Judge. No, I don't. I have nothing.

JUDGE CHAGARES: We will take the case under advisement. It's a very interesting case, and, again, we'll take the case under advisement

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